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Abstract
We demonstrate the existence of an eÆcient block cipher with the property that whenever it is composed with
any non-perfect cipher, the resulting product is strictly more secure, against an ideal adversary, than the original
cipher. We call this property universal security amplication, and note that it holds trivially for a one-time pad (a
stream cipher). However, as far as we are aware, this is the rst eÆcient block cipher with this property. Several
practical implications of this result are considered.
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1 Introduction
It is often asked in cryptography whether the product of two ciphers might be more or less secure than one of
the ciphers by itself. An amplication of security doesn't happen in general and important counterexamples have
been identied. For example, if the permutations of a block cipher form a group (or more precisely, are uniformly
distributed on a subgroup of the symmetric group on the set of message blocks), then two-key double encryption is
no better than single encryption. Thus, it has been seen as important to rule out this pathology in the case of DES
[4]. Furthermore, the security of a product can actually be less than that of the second cipher when the plaintext
statistics are ill-behaved with respect to the permutations of the rst cipher [12]. Nevertheless, depending on how
security is measured and how the ciphers are modeled, other aÆrmative results have been advanced [18, 8, 1].
In this paper, we take a novel approach to this problem, raising a strong existence question about the security of
product ciphers. Specically, we ask: Is there an eÆcient block cipher which amplies the security, against an ideal
adversary, of every non-perfect cipher with which it is composed? By construction, we answer this question in the
aÆrmative. The constructed cipher, as presented, would not be widely viewed as \practical" because it requires a
variable length key which grows with the amount of plaintext encrypted (much like a one-time pad). Furthermore,
the computation time for encrypting a single message block { though polynomial in the inputs { is slower than what
has become expected in the modern arena of fast encryption. On the other hand, it may be possible to accelerate
bulk encryption through parallelization techniques, and if a cryptographically strong substitute for the key were used
(such as a key schedule, hash, or pseudo-random function), then a negation of our claim of security amplication
would imply that an attacker had defeated the articial keying mechanism.
There are other practical implications of our result. First of all, the techniques used here could facilitate the
construction of computationally eÆcient S-boxes with provably strong security properties. More generally, if we
are to understand, in more than purely heuristic terms, the security convergence of modern iterated cryptosystems,
then our result establishes new limits on what can be accomplished in polynomial-time. Our construction might be
modied and compromised to obtain faster ciphers with complementary security results.
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2 Preliminaries
A basic familiarity with random variables and probability spaces [10] is assumed. Some group theory [17] is also
assumed, but in the next subsection, we shall review some important terminology about permutation groups [7].
2.1 Permutation Groups
Let X be any set. The collection of all invertible functions on X forms the symmetric group S
X
. Any subgroup
G  S
X
is called a permutation group, and we also say that G acts on X and that X is a G-set. The subgroup of
G which xes a point x 2 X is called the (point) stabilizer of x, and is given by Stab
G
(x) = fh 2 G jhx = xg .
When studying n-bit block ciphers, the nite set M = f0; 1g
n
of all n-bit binary strings (or equivalently the
integers f0; 1; : : : ; 2
n
  1g) is the most natural G-set for some permutation group G  S
M
. But additionally for this
paper, we will often consider two other actions of G on related sets. ByM
(`)
we mean the set of tuples of size ` with
distinct elements inM , G acting elementwise. If p = (p
1
; : : : ; p
`
) 2M
(`)
, the point stabilizer Stab
G
(p) is sometimes
written Stab
G
(p
1
; : : : ; p
`
). ByM
fmg
we mean the set of subsets ofM of size m, where g 2 G acts on S 2M
fmg
by
taking S 7! gS. The point stabilizer of S 2M
fmg
is sometimes written Stab
G
fSg.
2.2 Shannon's Model and Product Ciphers
Following Shannon [18], we model an n-bit block cipher as a S
M
-valued random variable. If a cipher X only takes
values in a subgroup G  S
M
, then X may be called a G-cipher. We may model a stream cipher in the same
spirit (cf. [13]). Let f0; 1g

denote the (innite) set of nite binary strings, and let H  S
f0;1g

be the subgroup of
length-preserving permutations. We shall call an H-valued random variable a stream cipher
1
. By a cipher we mean
either a block cipher or a stream cipher.
Given two independent ciphers X and Y acting on the same message space, the cipher XY is called a product
cipher, Y is called its rst component and X is called its second component. The distribution of the product of two
block ciphers is given by the convolution,
P [XY = g] = x  y(g)
4
=
X
h2G
x(gh
 1
)y(h); (1)
where x(g) = P [X = g] and y(g) = P [Y = g]. This representation of a product cipher will prove useful in the sequel.
The cipher U which is uniformly distributed on S
M
is called the perfect cipher. For any subgroup G  S
M
the G-cipher U
G
which is uniformly distributed on G is called the uniform G-cipher. Given a innite sequence of
independent and uniformly random bits, z
0
; z
1
; : : :, we may form a simple stream cipher, called the one-time pad, by
mapping plaintext word m into z
jmj
m, where z
jmj
is the word z
0
   z
jmj
.
2.3 The Computational Model
Shannon's model is a purely probabilistic one; it says very little about how a computer might transform plaintext into
ciphertext and back. For a cipher X to be practical, there should be eective procedures for encryption (computing
the action of X on plaintext) and decryption (computing the action of X
 1
on ciphertext).
One natural choice for the computational model is the standard Turing machine model [9]. Informally, we have an
encryption algorithm Enc, which has as input arguments the plaintext m and the random key k, and which outputs
ciphertext c. The corresponding decryption algorithm Dec is similarly dened. Formally in this model, we require
a pair of deterministic Turing machines E and D, such that (under suitable encoding) m = D(k;E(k;m)), for all
m and k. Notice that under this model, all randomness enters as an argument to the encryption and decryption
algorithms, or equivalently as input data on the Turing machine tapes. Our view is that this model of computation
1
In practice, a stream cipher will typically also have consistent block prex action, i.e. for some integer n, it will be conned to
permutations h 2 H such that when juj = ju
0
j 2 nZ, h(uw) = u
0
w
0
implies that for all v of length jwj, h(uv) = u
0
v
0
for some v
0
.
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is unnecessarily restrictive, because it fails to capture the simple idea that some ciphers (like the one-time pad)
are \computationally eÆcient" even though they may require impractical amounts of key material to encrypt every
possible plaintext.
Alternatively, we consider encryption and decryption algorithms which access key material as an auxiliary sub-
routine call. Formally, such a subroutine call is idealized by an oracle function f : f0; 1g

 ! f0; 1g, and we are
thus invoking the computational model of an oracle Turing machine (OTM) [9]. An OTM is a deterministic Turing
machine augmented by an oracle tape and additional logic so that that at any time, the oracle tape with input
 written on it can, in one step of computation, be transformed to have f() written on it. An OTM M with
specic oracle function f will be denoted by M
f
, and its time complexity is computed in the usual way (with oracle
evaluation counting as one step). We may model uncertainty about the oracle function by treating it as an instance
of a random oracle function F : f0; 1g

 ! f0; 1g.
The next two denitions capture our intuitive notion of eÆcient encryption/decryption for block and stream
ciphers, respectively.
Denition 1 (EÆcient Block Ciphers) A ensemble of block ciphers fX
n
g
n2N
will be called computable in
polynomial-time if there exists a random oracle function F and a pair of polynomial-time OTM's, E and D, such
that for each n 2 N: (i). for each p 2 f0; 1g
n
, p = D
F
(E
F
(p)), and (ii). the distribution of E
F
, restricted to strings
of length n, identical to that of X
n
, and (iii). the distribution of D
F
, restricted to strings of length n, is identical to
that of X
 1
n
. 2
By a mild but common abuse of notation, a block cipher X acting on f0; 1g
n
will be called computable in polynomial-
time if it is one of an ensemble of such ciphers, and any important properties hold for each representative.
Denition 2 (EÆcient Stream Ciphers) A stream cipher X will be called computable in polynomial-time
if there exists a random oracle function F and a pair of polynomial-time OTM's, E and D, such that: (i). for each
p 2 f0; 1g

, p = D
F
(E
F
(p)), and (ii). the distribution of E
F
is identical to that of X, and (iii). the distribution of
D
F
is identical that of X
 1
. 2
Note that by Defs. 1 and 2, both the one-time pad and the Luby-Racko construction [13] are eÆcient. In fact,
each is computable in linear time. Notice also that being computable in polynomial-time does not preclude that
exponentially many bits may be necessary to completely describe the cipher's action on the entire message space.
For example, each round of the Luby-Racko construction (a Feistel cipher with a perfectly random function acting
on half-words) takes on one of
 
2
n
2

2
n
2
distinct permutations of an n-bit message space. Thus, for the common 3-round version of the construction, there
must be 3n2
(
n 2
2
)
bits to entirely describe it.
However, neither the one-time pad nor the Luby-Racko construction meets our objective. The one-time pad is
not a block cipher. Furthermore, every permutation of the Luby-Racko construction is even and hence is conned
to a proper subgroup (the alternating group, A
M
 S
M
), and we shall see from Lemma 1 below that it cannot be
an universal security amplier.
2.4 Optimal Chosen Plaintext Attacks
We now introduce the measure of security in terms of which strict security inequalities will be derived. Informally,
it is just the average cost of the optimal (non-adaptive) chosen plaintext attack for an adversary in possession of
an oracle which will answer the question, \is X = g?". There are two stages to the optimal strategy. First the
adversary discards all permutations which are inconsistent with the acquired plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Then among
the remaining permutations, he queries the oracle for the exact permutation in order of non-increasing probability.
The adversary will obviously choose the plaintexts such that the average cost of this strategy is minimized. The
diÆculty of this attack is a direct and meaningful measure of the cipher's security.
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To formally quantify this attack against a G-cipher X , G  S
M
, let us assume that the adversary has collected
` plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts into tuples p; c 2 M
(`)
, respectively. The ciphertext tuple c is an
instance of the random variable C
`
= Xp, whose uncertainty is due exclusively to uncertainty about X . Now for
any random variable Z the average cost of guessing its value is called the guesswork
2
of Z and is given by
W (Z)
4
=
m
X
i=1
p
[i]
i; (2)
where Z takes on m values, and where the probabilities of Z have been arranged according to p
[i]
 p
[j]
for all i < j.
For xed p and c, the conditional guesswork W (X jc; p) is the guesswork of X as in Equation (2) after discarding
all permutations g 2 G such that c 6= gp, and then rearranging and rescaling the probabilities accordingly. Now we
must still account for the uncertainty about C
`
. Evidently, for a particular choice of plaintext tuple p, the cost of
the attack must be weighted by the a posteriori probabilities !(cjp) = P

C
`
= c j p

, yielding
W (X jC
`
; p) =
X
c2M
(`)
W (X jc; p)!(cjp): (3)
The minimum value of W (X jC
`
; p) is the optimal chosen plaintext attack work factor, which will be denoted

`
(X) = min
p2M
(`)
W (X jC
`
; p): (4)
For continuity we take 
0
(X) to be W (X).
3 The Main Result
3.1 The Existence Theorem
We shall prove by construction the following theorem.
Theorem 1 There is a cipher X, computable in polynomial-time, such that for each 0  `  2
n
and every indepen-
dent cipher Y , 
`
(XY )  
`
(Y ). Furthermore, equality holds i 
`
(Y ) = 
`
(U).
It is easily seen (see e.g. [15]) that no non-perfect cipher Y can have 
`
(Y ) = 
`
(U), for all `. Thus this theorem
tells us in a very meaningful way, that every non-perfect cipher is brought closer to the the perfect cipher by left
multiplication by X .
The proof of Thm. 1 relies on three lemmas which treat dierent aspects of the problem. To express these lemmas
succinctly, we introduce some additional terminology. First, the support of aG-cipher (or indeed any random variable)
may be dened as supp(X)
4
= fg 2 G jP [X = g] 6= 0g . Second, it is useful to denote the size of the smallest `-message
stabilizer of a group by M
G
(`)
4
= min
p2M
(`)
jStab
G
(p)j. It is easily seen that 
`
(U
G
) =
1
2
[1 +M
G
(`)].
The rst lemma from [15] treats the case ` = 0 but is also useful in establishing the other results.
Lemma 1 Given G  S
M
, let X be a G-cipher. Every independent non-uniform G-cipher Y satises W (XY ) >
W (Y ), i for each g 2 G and each subgroup H 6= G, supp(X) 6 gH.
The next lemma provides suÆcient conditions for nearly universal amplication (` > 0) for ciphers in any permutation
group.
Lemma 2 For a permutation group G  S
M
, let X be a G-cipher such that supp(X) = G. Then for each 1  `  2
n
and every independent G-cipher Y , 
`
(XY )  
`
(Y ). Furthermore, equality holds i 
`
(Y ) = 
`
(U
G
).
The nal lemma asserts the existence of a cipher suitable to translate Lemmas 1 and 2 into Thm. 1.
2
Guesswork has sometimes been called guessing entropy, cf. [16] and [3].
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Lemma 3 There is a cipher X, computable in polynomial-time, with supp(X) = S
M
.
Assuming the validity of the above lemmas, the proof of Thm. 1 is immediate.
The proof of Lemma 2 is rather involved and is sketched in Sect. 4.4. Most of the rest of this paper is devoted to
the construction of X and the proof of Lemma 3. Before diving into the precise details in Sect. 4, let us rst take a
slightly more informal look at the ideas underlying this construction.
3.2 An Intuitive Glimpse at the Construction
The symmetric group on the message space is truly enormous. It's size is approximated by
log log(2
n
!)  n+ log(n) = O(n):
Because it takes two logarithms to bring 2
n
! down to the polynomial n, our construction will exhibit two distinct
sources of algorithmic eÆciency:
1. Recursion: The cipher X will be recursively dened as the product of simpler ciphers. More precisely, the
encryption algorithm Enc will itself be recursive but will also call another recursive algorithm invSort. The
decryption algorithm Dec will be similarly dened. The time complexity and recursion depth of each algorithm
will be a polynomial in n.
2. Oblivious Action
3
: The cipher X will be representable as the product of a large number of random powers of
transpositions (i.e. permutations of message blocks two at a time). Then Enc and Dec, the dening algorithms
of X , will make use of polynomially many transpositions for every block encrypted.
Let G  S
M
be any permutation group. There are many ways to construct a product cipher PQ which achieves
every permutation in G, even though both P and Q are sparse on G. Indeed for any subgroup H  G, we may take
Q which achieves every permutation in H and P which achieves one permutation in every left coset of H in G. It
is easy to see that PQ achieves every permutation in G. For many large groups, it is possible to nd subgroups
satisfying jGj  jH j and jGj  [G :H ]. Formally, we have an amplication of support: jsupp(PQ)j  jsupp(P )j,
and jsupp(PQ)j  jsupp(Q)j. Thus by exploiting the algebraic structure of the group, we may construct a densely
distributed cipher as a product of very sparsely distributed ciphers.
Let's try to carry this idea even further. Consider a chain of subgroups of G
f1g = H
0
 H
1
     H
m
= G;
and for each i, an H
i
-cipher P
i
which contains one permutation in every left coset of H
i 1
in H
i
. Then by simple
induction, the product cipher P
m
  P
2
P
1
, would have complete support on G. For example in the symmetric group
on 2
n
symbols, consider the subgroups H
i
= Stab(1; : : : ; 2
n
  i), 0  i  2
n
. On the one hand, this choice of
subgroups is promising because the number of cosets in S
2
n
of the largest proper subgroup is the polynomial n.
Unfortunately however, there are 2
n
subgroups in this chain, and so the number of terms in the product P
m
  P
2
P
1
grows exponentially with n. If we are to employ this technique, it may be inconvenient to use a chain of subgroups
which x collections of words in M { either as tuples or as sets { because any hierarchy of such collections would
typically be as large asM itself.
It thus makes more sense to dene subgroups which x some feature of the words in M . To that end dene K
i
to be the subgroup consisting of the permutations of S
M
which preserve the rst n  i bits of each message block.
We shall call K
i
the (n  i)-bit prex stabilizer subgroup of S
M
, and as i ranges from 0 to n these form the chain of
subgroups
f1g = K
0
 K
1
     K
n
= S
M
: (5)
3
We borrow this term from [14] where it is used in the same context.
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We will construct, for each 1  i  n, a K
i
-cipher P
i
which contains one permutation in every left coset of K
i 1
in
K
i
. Then the cipher of Lemma 3 will be dened as
X = P
n
  P
2
P
1
: (6)
But let us compute the minimal support required of P
n
. That is to say let us count the number of left cosets of
K
n 1
in S
M
. Since K
n 1
permutes all but the most signicant bit of words in M , the left cosets of K
n 1
are
characterized by the rearrangements of M with distinct patterns of the most signicant bit. There are precisely
[S
M
:K
n 1
] =
 
2
n
2
n 1
!
of these rearrangements. Observe that while we have reduced the number of permutations by a large number (by
(2
n 1
!)
2
in fact), on a doubly logarithmic scale we still have
log log
 
2
n
2
n 1
!
 n+ 1 = O(n):
It may appear that we are right back where we started, yet we have transported the problem onto very fertile new
ground.
The eÆciency in our algorithms for P
i
has its heritage in the closely related problem of card shuing. In fact,
both the security of a product cipher [15] and the fairness of a shued deck of cards [2, 6] is related to the uniformity
of convolutions as in equation (1). In their now famous analysis rie shues, Aldous and Diaconis remarked that
\the lovely new idea here is to consider shuing as inverse sorting." [2, Remark (a), p. 344]. Indeed it is quite
natural to consider encryption as inverse sorting because the rearrangements ofM which characterize the left cosets
of K
n 1
 S
M
correspond precisely with the permutations which would be used in the rst step of the obvious
recursive sorting algorithm. In the reverse order, we may achieve all permutations of M by rst achieving all
rearrangements of the most signicant bit, and then proceeding recursively with the less signicant bits. What
we claim is that sorting and inverse sorting on the most signicant bit can be done in polynomial-time using both
recursion and the oblivious action of transpositions. The rest is gravy.
Let us demonstrate this eÆciency in a simple example with n = 3 and thus M = f0; 1; : : : ; 7g. We start
with a random arrangement (6; 3; 5; 0; 7; 1; 4; 2) of the elements of M , and attempt to sort this tuple on the most
signicant bit by the application of n = 3 rounds of involutions (recall that every involution is a product of disjoint
transpositions). For reasons of eÆciency we shall restrict ourselves to transpositions of the form (j; j  2
i
), with i
constant for every round. The allowable round involutions are (01)
b
1
(23)
b
2
(45)
b
3
(67)
b
4
, (02)
b
5
(13)
b
6
(46)
b
7
(57)
b
8
and
(04)
b
7
(15)
b
9
(26)
b
10
(37)
b
11
, for rounds 0, 1 and 2, respectively. Table 1 below shows that we can indeed sort on the
most signicant bit of 2
n
integers by carefully choosing the powers b
i
in only only n rounds.
To overcome the limitations of having so few permutations, our strategy is as follows: the goal at the end of
round 1, is to collect integers with leading 1 into the lowest part of the bottom half (those positions  3), and to
collect integers with leading 0 into the lowest part of the top half (those positions  4). Then the powers of the
transpositions in the nal round (round 2) are determined by the sorting requirement. We claim that this strategy
will work for all n.
4 The Construction Details
In the next two subsections we present the detailed construction of the cipher X of Lemma 3. In the following two
subsections we prove Lemma 3 and sketch the proof of Lemma 2, respectively.
6
round (transp./arrangemnt.)
0 1 2
7 2 = 010 (67) 100 () 100 () 100
6 4 = 100 (67) 010 (46) 111 () 111
5 1 = 001 () 001 () 001 (15) 101
4 7 = 111 () 111 (46) 010 (04) 110
3 0 = 000 (23) 101 (13) 011 () 011
2 5 = 101 (23) 000 () 000 () 000
1 3 = 011 () 011 (13) 101 (15) 001
0 6 = 110 () 110 () 110 (04) 010
Table 1: A randomly chosen arrangement of f0; 1; : : : ; 7g is sorted with respect to the most signicant bit after
the application of only 3 rounds of disjoint transpositions. The rst two columns indicate the initial arrangement
(position, value). The next three columns give, for each round, the transposition aecting the value at that position
and subsequent arrangement.
4.1 Algebraic Details
We may encrypt by inverting the sorting procedure described in the previous section. Formally, for any j, dene
R
(j)
i
to be the product of independent and uniformly random powers of the 2
n 1
distinct transpositions of the form
(k; k  2
i
), with 0  k  2
n
  1. Then let
P
i
= R
(i)
0
R
(i)
1
  R
(i)
i 1
;
and as before X = P
n
  P
2
P
1
. Each random involution R
(j)
i
corresponds to a \round" as shown in Fig. 1 below.
Note that while there is repetition (e.g. R
(j
1
)
i
and R
(j
2
)
i
are i.i.d. random variables), X is not a traditional iterated
cryptosystems because the specic sequence of rounds is carefully chosen.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
| {z }
P
1
| {z }
P
2
| {z }
P
3
Figure 1: The structure of the cipher X = P
3
P
2
P
1
for n = 3. The rounds are applied left to right, and each
round corresponds to a random involution shown as a vertical column of butteries. Each buttery in the diagram
represents a random transposition of the form (k; k2
i
)
b
, where parallel lines indicate b = 0 and a crossover indicates
b = 1.
4.2 Algorithm Details
It is clear that we may recursively aect the actions of X and X
 1
on any block, if we can carry out the rounds R
(j)
i
in
the correct order and in such a way that the powers of all relevant transpositions are independent and equiprobable.
Moreover, if we encounter the the same buttery in two dierent executions, we must be able to reproduce the same
random power of the corresponding transposition. This is easily accomplished if we consider the random bits to be
indexed byM Z. The resulting function f :M Z ! f0; 1g is easily transformed into a random oracle function
F : f0; 1g

 ! f0; 1g appropriate for Def. 1. We employ the convention that the power of any transposition (k; k2
i
)
is f(m; r), where m = minfk; k  2
i
g and r is the round. In other words, f is applied to the lower left hand corner
of every buttery in Fig. 1.
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The next algorithm implements encryption. To encrypt a single plaintext block, the computational complexity
will be n(n+ 1)=2 or O
 
1
2
n
2

. For a block size of n = 128, this yields about 8; 256 operations.
Algorithm 1 Denes recursive encryption functions Enc and invSort. The action of X = P
n
  P
2
P
1
on p 2M is
aected by (q; r) = Enc(p; n; 1), such that q = Xp. The action of P
i
on p 2M is aected by (q; r) = invSort(p; i 1; ),
such that q = P
i
p.
function Enc(p; i; r):
if i > 1 then
(q; r) = Enc(p; i  1; r).
endif
return invSort(q; i  1; r).
function invSort(p; j; r):
q = p 2
j
.
if p < q then
b = f(p; r).
else
b = f(q; r).
endif
if b = 0 then
q = p.
endif
if j > 0 then
return invSort(q; j   1; r + 1).
else
return (q; r + 1).
endif
The decryption algorithm is easily obtained by performing the the transpositions in the reverse order. The necessary
modications are immediate, and we shall call the \reverse" of inverse-sorting fwdSort.
Algorithm 2 Denes recursive decryption functions Dec and fwdSort. The action of X
 1
= P
 1
1
P
 1
2
  P
 1
n
on
p 2M is aected by (q; r) = Dec(p; n;
1
2
n(n+ 1)), such that q = X
 1
p. The action of P
 1
i
on p 2M is aected by
(q; r) = fwdSort(p; i  1; ), such that q = P
 1
i
p.
function Dec(p; i; r):
(q; r) = fwdSort(q; i  1; r).
if i > 1 then
return Dec(q; i  1; r).
else
return (q; r).
endif
function fwdSort(p; j; r):
if j > 0 then
(p; r) = fwdSort(p; j   1; r).
endif
q = p 2
j
.
if p < q then
b = f(p; r).
else
b = f(q; r).
endif
if b = 0 then
return (p; r   1).
else
return (q; r   1).
endif
Remark 1 Notice how the round information is explicitly carried by input/output argument r through the entire
recursion processed. During the execution of Enc, it is incremented, while during the execution of Dec it is decre-
mented. This is necessary because encryption and decryption must agree on the random bits f(p; r) which determine
the appropriate powers of the various transpositions involved. 2
4.3 The Proof of Lemma 3
To prove Lemma 3 we must rst develop some terminology and prove some preliminary results. Recall that the
integers inM will have a dual role as n-bit strings. When treating prexes and other substrings it is useful to have
8
a padding function 
i
: Z  ! f0; 1g
i
taking j to the binary representation of j mod 2
i
padded up to i bits. Also
dene a prex truncation function 
i
: f0; 1g

 ! f0; 1g
i
taking binary word w to its rst i bits (the most signicant
i bits).
It is natural for us to recursively partitionM into disjoint subsets which share the same prex. For example, let
S
0
= fi 2M j 
1
(i) = 0g and S
1
= fi 2M j 
1
(i) = 1g , so that M is the disjoint union S
0
[ S
1
. More generally, let
S

i
(j)
= fk 2M j 
i
(k) = 
i
(j)g with 1  j  2
i
  1, and again we partitionM into disjoint subsets
M =
2
i
 1
[
j=0
S

i
(j)
:
The prex stabilizers are naturally expressed in terms of these subsets, for example clearly K
n 1
= Stab
K
n
fS
0
g \
Stab
K
n
fS
1
g, and more generally
K
n i
=
2
i
 1
\
j=0
Stab
K
n
fS

i
(j)
g:
The following proposition characterizes the left cosets of K
n 1
 K
n
.
Proposition 1 A left coset of K
n 1
in K
n
is completely determined by the image of S
0
under the action of any left
coset representative.
Proof: First of all K
n 1
= Stab
K
n
fS
0
g \ Stab
K
n
fS
1
g = Stab
K
n
fS
0
g, because anything which xes S
0
must also x
S
1
. Now K
n
= S
M
acts transitively on the setM
f2
n 1
g
of all subsets ofM of half its size. By standard group action
arguments [17, 7], the left cosets fgK
n 1
g are in one-to-one correspondence with the images fgS
0
g, in a well-dened
way. 2
We shall derive presently a similar characterization of the left cosets of K
n i 1
in K
n i
. First let's agree that
whenever A  B we will consider S
A
to be a subgroup of S
B
. Recall [17] that if a group G factors into product
G = HK of normal subgroups H and K, with H \K = f1g, then G is a direct product of H and K (it is literally
isomorphic to the Cartesian product with the obvious group law). Clearly whenever B is a disjoint union of A
1
and
A
2
, S
B
contains the direct product S
A
1
S
A
2
. Visibly, K
n 1
= S
S
0
S
S
1
, and if we write S

i
(j)
= S
S

i
(j)
, we also
have that K
n i
is the direct product
K
n i
=
2
i
 1
Y
j=0
S

i
(j)
:
Proposition 2 A left coset of K
n i 1
in K
n i
is completely determined by the images of S

i
(j)0
, 0  j  2
i
  1,
under the action of any left coset representative.
Proof: Because K
n i
is the direct product given above, a left coset gK
n i 1
factors into a product of left cosets
2
i
 1
Y
j=0
g
j

Stab
S

i
(j)
fS

i
(j)0
g \ Stab
S

i
(j)
fS

i
(j)1
g

:
However, we again have Stab
S

i
(j)
fS

i
(j)0
g \ Stab
S

i
(j)
fS

i
(j)1
g = Stab
S

i
(j)
fS

i
(j)0
g. Finally, 2
i
invocations of
Prop. 1 obtains the desired result. 2
With this machinery in place, we may now prove Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 3: Recall that in order to facilitate the induction argument of Sect. 3.2, thereby establishing that
supp(X) = S
M
, we must show that (for each i) supp(P
n i
) contains a representative of each left coset of K
n i 1
in
K
n i
.
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What we'll actually show, by an inner induction argument, is that for every subset S M contiguous on each
S

i
(j)
(0  j  2
i
  1) and every possible image T of S under the action of K
n i
(i.e., every T of the form gS for
some g 2 K
n i
), supp(P
n i
) contains a permutation g taking S 7! T . Since each S

i
(j)0
is trivially a contiguous
subset of S

i
(j)
, we have the desired result by Prop. 2. Note also that if we can take an arbitrary contiguous set to
an arbitrary image, then we can also take an arbitrary complement of a contiguous set to an arbitrary image.
Induction Base: Clearly K
1
is isomorphic to the direct product of 2
n 1
symmetric groups on 2 elements (cyclic
groups of order 2), and thus has size jK
1
j = 2
2
n 1
. Since jsupp(P
1
)j = 2
2
n 1
also, the induction hypothesis holds
trivially.
Induction Step: Without loss of generality, we consider the case i = 0. By hypothesis, supp(P
n 1
) contains
an element of K
n 1
taking any contiguous subset of S
0
to a desired image ( S
0
, and of the same size), while
simultaneously taking any contiguous subset of S
1
to a desired image (again  S
1
, and of the same size). Choose
arbitrary sets U  S
0
; V  S
1
, let T = U [ V , and choose any contiguous set S  M of size jT j. Again without
loss of generality, we may assume that jS \ S
0
j  jU j (because otherwise jS \ S
1
j  jV j and a completely symmetric
argument applies). We must show that supp(P
n
) = supp(P
n 1
)supp(R
(n)
n 1
) contains a g such that gS = T . Write
g = hk, with h 2 S
S
0
; k 2 S
S
1
, and where  is some product of transpositions of the form (j; j  2
n 1
). Evidently
the real job of  is to send elements of S \ S
0
in excess of jU j across the most signicant bit boundary into S
1
,
because h; k 2 Stab
K
n
fS
0
g cannot do this later on. The transpositions in supp(R
(n)
n 1
), which ip the most signicant
bit, are perfect for this task. Let  be the product of the transpositions (j; j  2
n 1
), with j 2 J , where J consists
of the highest jS \ S
0
j   jU j elements of S \ S
0
. We claim that (S) \ S
0
is a contiguous subset of S
0
, and that
(S) \ S
1
is either a contiguous subset or the complement of a contiguous subset of S
1
. Assuming that is true,
then by the induction hypothesis, we may choose h taking (S) \ S
0
7! U and k taking (S) \ S
1
7! V , so that
gS = hk(S) = T .
Two cases naturally arise. (Case 1:) If S doesn't intersect with S
1
then  takes J contiguously to some image in
the middle of S
1
, and  leaves S   J contiguously in the middle of S
0
. (Case 2:) On the other hand, if S intersects
non-trivially with S
1
, then because S is contiguous, J is precisely the highest jS \S
0
j  jU j elements of S
0
itself, and
furthermore S\S
1
consists of the lowest jS\S
1
j elements of S
1
which are left xed by . Therefore (S)\S
1
consists
of the complement of a contiguous set (those elements between S \ S
1
and J). But again  leaves (S \ S
0
)   J
contiguously in the middle of S
0
. This completes the induction step for i = 0.
Applying this same argument within the appropriate direct product subgroups when i > 0 yields the inner
induction step and thus completes the proof. 2
Remark 2 The previous proof seems harrowing with 2 cases nested inside 2 w.l.o.g.'s nested inside of 2 layers of
induction. But, it is in essence just a rigorous form of the more intuitive sorting example given in the previous
section (which may have seemed simpler at rst glance). 2
4.4 Sketch of the Proof of Lemma 2
In this section, we shall sketch the proof of Lemma 2 with the help of some preliminary results.
The following inequality from [15] is essentially the translation into guesswork terminology of a nice result at-
tributed to Day [5] about majorization for sums of real vectors (see [11] and [15]). Given anym vectors x
(1)
; : : : ; x
(m)
2
R
n
+
, m doubly stochastic n n matrices D
1
; : : : ; D
m
, and m positive real numbers !
1
; : : : ; !
m
, we have
W
 
m
X
i=1
!
i
D
i
x
(i)
!

m
X
i=1
!
i
W (x
(i)
): (7)
Our technique for quantifying and comparing various performance values of the optimal chosen plaintext attack
typically starts with a xed ` and xed p 2M
(`)
. We then proceed to study how the cipher's structure aects the
expression of equation (3). A simple but useful observation is that the conditional guessworkW (Y jc; p) is completely
determined by the distribution of Y on some coset of the stabilizerH = Stab
G
(p). Let k = [G :H ] and x a set fg
i
g
k
i=1
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of left coset representatives of H in G. It is useful to treat the distribution y(g) = P [Y = g] as giant vector in RG
(the real vector space spanned by G) which decomposes into to a direct sum of left coset component vectors (i.e. one
component vector for each subspace of RG spanned by coset g
i
H). For our purposes, a mathematically convenient
way to deal with y (especially when handling the complicated bookkeeping involved with product ciphers) is to
exploit the fact that each coset subspace Rg
i
H is isomorphic (as a vector space) to RH . The resulting isomorphism
naturally takes the form a tensor product (of RH-modules) known as the induced representation from H to G by
RH :
RG

=
RG 

RH
RH =
[G:H]
M
i=1
g
i

 RH; (8)
where the isomorphism takes g
i
h 7! g
i

 h, and
X
g2G
y(g)g 7! by =
k
X
i=1
g
i

 y
(i)
: (9)
Note that fy
(i)
g
k
i=1
are just the component distribution vectors of y(g) on the cosets H , only in this form they are
represented as vectors in RH . It follows directly from the denition that
W (Y jC
`
; p) =
k
X
i=1
W (y
(i)
):
Now recall that the product Z = XY of two independent G-ciphers X and Y has distribution P [XY = g] =
xy(g), which from equation (1) has the form of a matrix multiplication. Indeed using the direct sum decomposition
of the induced representation given in equation (8), we shall derive the block structure of this matrix. Using this
structure we shall compare the distribution within the appropriate cosets of H for XY vs. Y . The key is to represent
Y by by as in equation (9), but to leave X as a convex sum of the permutations in G weighted by x(g) = P [X = g].
We aim to derive the form of Z represented by bz 2 RG 

RH
RH , again as in equation (9).
Now any g 2 G acts by left multiplication on any g
j

 v 2 RG 

RH
RH according to g(g
j

 v) = g
i

 hv, where
gg
j
H = g
i
H , so that h 2 H is uniquely determined by gg
j
= g
i
h. Thus we have that
bz =
k
X
i=1
g
i

 z
(i)
=
0
@
X
g2G
x(g)g
1
A
0
@
k
X
j=1
g
j

 y
(j)
1
A
=
k
X
j=1
0
@
X
g2G
x(g)g
1
A
(g
j

 y
(j)
):
For any particular i we may collect together contributions to direct summand g
i

 RH ,
g
i

 z
(i)
=
k
X
j=1
X
g g
j
H=g
i
H
x(g) g (g
j

 y
(j)
)
=
k
X
j=1
X
g2 
ij
x(g)(g
i

 h
ij
(g)y
(j)
)
= g
i


0
@
k
X
j=1
0
@
X
g2 
ij
x(g)h
ij
(g)
1
A
y
(j)
1
A
;
where  
ij
= fg 2 G j g g
j
H = g
i
Hg and h
ij
(g) = g
 1
i
gg
j
. Thus,
z
(i)
=
k
X
j=1
!
ij
D
ij
y
(j)
; (10)
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where
D
ij
=
X
g2 
ij
x(g)
x( 
ij
)
h
ij
(g); (11)
and where !
ij
= x( 
ij
). Notice that the sum in equation (11) is a convex sum of permutations in H , hence each D
ij
takes the form of a doubly stochastic matrix under a suitable ordering of H (the basis vectors of RH). Furthermore,
it can easily be shown that the values of !
ij
are the elements of a doubly stochastic matrix [15]. Also note that
 
ii
= H
g
i
 G for each i. The true core of Lemma 2 is the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For a permutation group G  S
M
, let X and Y be independent G-ciphers such that supp(X) = G.
For any p 2 M
(`)
such that Y is non-uniform on at least one left coset of Stab
G
(p), we have W (XY jC
`
; p) >
W (Y jC
`
; p).
Proof: Let p satisfy the assumption of the proposition, and let bz represent the distribution of the product Z = XY
as above. Let y
(j)
be non-uniform and consider D
jj
y
(j)
. That is to say, let us focus on this one submatrix block on
the diagonal of the larger doubly stochastic matrix representing the convolution z = x  y.
Since  
jj
= H
g
j
, we may rewrite D
jj
as
D
jj
=
X
g2 
jj
x(g)
x( 
jj
)
g
g
 1
j
=
X
h2H
x(h
g
j
)
x(H
g
j
)
h:
Thus we see that by scaling appropriately, D
jj
y
(j)
has the form of a product of two independent H-ciphers
e
X
e
Y , with
P
h
e
X = h
i
= P [X = h
g
j
] =x(H
g
j
), and P
h
e
Y = h
i
= P [Y = g
j
h] =y(g
j
H). But since supp(X) = G and conjugation
by g
j
yields an isomorphism of H  !  
jj
, supp(
e
X) is not conned to any proper coset of H , and we may invoke
Lemma 1 to obtain W (
e
X
e
Y ) > W (
e
Y ) or more importantly for our purposes, W (D
jj
y
(j)
) > W (y
(j)
).
Note that we may bound any W (z
(i)
) by the inequality of equation (7) as
W (z
(i)
) = W
 
k
X
m=1
!
im
D
im
y
(m)
!

k
X
m=1
!
im
W (y
(m)
);
but by using W (D
jj
y
(j)
) > W (y
(j)
) and equation (7) again, we may strictly bound W (z
(j)
) as follows
W (z
(j)
) = W
 
k
X
m=1
!
jm
D
jm
y
(m)
!

k
X
m=1
!
jm
W (D
jm
y
(m)
)
>
k
X
m=1
!
jm
W (y
(m)
):
(Note that in both cases we have used, for doubly stochastic D, the inequality W (Dv)  W (v) which follows from
simple majorization arguments [15]). Combining these bounds on W (z
(i)
) we obtain a strict bound on W (ZjC
`
; p)
as follows
W (ZjC
`
; p) =
k
X
i=1
W (z
(i)
) >
k
X
i=1
k
X
m=1
!
im
W (y
(m)
)
=
k
X
m=1
W (y
(m)
)
k
X
i=1
!
im
=
k
X
m=1
W (y
(m)
) = W (Y jC
`
; p);
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which was to be proved. 2
Remark 3 Evidently, in the previous proposition, we could weaken the condition supp(X) = G to: For every
p 2 M
(`)
, supp(X) \ Stab
G
(p) is not conned to a proper coset of Stab
G
(p). However, for our purposes in this
paper, it was not necessary to use the weaker condition. 2
The next proposition provides an important interpretation of the situation when a cipher is uniform on every
coset of an `-message stabilizer.
Proposition 4 Let Y be a G-cipher, for a permutation group G  S
M
. For any p 2 M
(`)
, write H = Stab
G
(p)
and we have
W (Y jC
`
; p) 
1 + jH j
2
;
with equality holding i Y is uniform on each coset of H.
Proof: For c 2M
(`)
with !(cjp) 6= 0,
1 W (Y jc; p) 
1 + jH j
2
;
because W (Y jc; p) is the guesswork on a coset of size jH j. Furthermore, equality in the upper bound is achieved i
Y has constant probability on that particular coset [15]. Now since
P
c2M
(`)
!(cjp) = 1, the sum from equation (3)
W (Y jC
`
; p) =
X
c2M
(`)
W (Y jc; p)!(cjp)
is convex and therefore achieves its maximum of
1
2
(1 + jH j) i Y is constant on each coset of H (Y will of course
have the constant probability 0 on those cosets corresponding to !(cjp) = 0). 2
By tying together the previous two propositions, we may nally prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2: Again, let us write Z = XY . Suppose there is a p 2M
(`)
such that 
`
(Z) =W (ZjC
`
; p) and Y
is non-uniform on at least one coset of Stab
G
(p). Then we may invoke Prop. 3 to obtain

`
(Z) =W (ZjC
`
; p) > W (Y jC
`
; p)  
`
(Y ):
On the other hand, suppose that for every p 2M
(`)
satisfying 
`
(Z) = W (ZjC
`
; p), Y is uniform on each coset
of Stab
G
(p). Let H = Stab
G
(p) for any such p. By equation (10), Z is uniform on each coset of H as well, and by
Prop. 4,

`
(Z) =W (ZjC
`
; p) =
1 + jH j
2
Now choose any bp with jStab
G
(bp)j =M
G
(`) and hence

`
(Z) =
1 + jH j
2
W (ZjC
`
; bp) 
1 +M
G
(`)
2
;
forcing jH j = M
G
(`), and thus 
`
(Z) = 
`
(U
G
). Then, either 
`
(Y ) 6= 
`
(U
G
), in which case 
`
(Z) > 
`
(Y ), or

`
(Y ) = 
`
(U
G
).
To summarize what we have proved thus far, 
`
(Z)  
`
(Y ) and if equality holds then 
`
(Y ) = 
`
(U
G
). However
conversely, if 
`
(Y ) = 
`
(U
G
), then 
`
(U
G
)  
`
(Z)  
`
(Y ) = 
`
(U
G
), forcing equality 
`
(Z) = 
`
(Y ), which
completes the proof. 2
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5 Conclusion
The issue of security amplication by product composition remains a complex one. In this paper, we have added
to the number of situations where a denite answer can be given. Specically, Thm. 1 asserts that there exists
eÆcient cipher X such that the security of XY is strictly greater than Y unless Y is perfect. There is room for
further improvement in this result. For example, a more eÆcient cipher might be constructed which makes use of
a weakened form of Lemma 2 as discussed in Remark 3. Additionally, our implementation might be optimized for
bulk encryption.
The cipher we construct to prove Thm. 1 is costly in some ways but has other desirable properties. Unlike a
one-time pad, if the key were replaced by a pseudo-random source, a known plaintext-ciphertext block would not
trivially betray the key used for that block. This property could be useful in constructing provably secure practical
encryption systems. Also observe that our construction is not an iterated cryptosystem but rather a product of
independent rounds with a carefully chosen order. The techniques employed here might be a useful new paradigm
for practical cryptosystems with key schedules instead of a truly random source of key material.
Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Serge Vaudenay for his many insightful comments, and in particular for
suggesting the formal computational model of Sect. 2.
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